This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent patent instruments on innovation. We …rst analyze patent breadth that captures the traditional positive e¤ect of patent rights on innovation. Then, we consider a pro…t-division rule between entrants and incumbents. Given the division of pro…t, increasing the share of pro…t assigned to incumbents reduces entrants'incentives for innovation. This aspect of blocking patents captures the recently proposed negative e¤ect of patent rights on innovation. Finally, blocking patents generate a non-monotonic e¤ect on innovation when the step size of innovation is endogenous due to a novel escape-infringement e¤ect. Calibrating the model to aggregate data, we …nd that a marginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to raise economic growth.
Introduction
The traditional understanding is that secure patent rights enhance the private return to R&D investment. According to this argument, stronger patent rights should increase innovation and economic growth. However, many economists, such as Bessen and Meurer (2008) , Boldrin and Levin (2008) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) , have recently raised doubt against this traditional viewpoint on patent protection. According to this recent argument, stronger patent rights reduce innovation by increasing the power of existing patent holders, who use their enhanced power to extract surplus from subsequent innovators rather than providing more innovation. In this note, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent patent instruments on innovation and economic growth. The …rst patent instrument that we analyze is patent breadth that captures the traditional positive e¤ect of patent rights on innovation. Then, we consider a pro…t-division rule between entrants and incumbents. Given the division of pro…t, increasing the share of pro…t assigned to incumbents reduces entrants'incentives for innovation, and this aspect of blocking patents captures the recently proposed negative e¤ect of patent rights on innovation. Finally, we show that blocking patents generate a non-monotonic e¤ect on innovation when the step size of innovation is endogenous due to an escape-infringement e¤ect that is often neglected in the patent literature.
Intuitively, in the presence of blocking patents, entrants would develop more substantial innovations in order to avoid infringing the patents of incumbents. Therefore, although blocking patents generate a negative e¤ect by reducing the arrival rate of innovation, they also generate a positive e¤ect by increasing the step size of innovation. Combining these positive and negative e¤ects of blocking patents gives rise to an inverted-U relationship between patent rights and innovation that has been documented in recent empirical studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007) . We also calibrate the model to aggregate data in order to quantify the e¤ect of blocking patents, and we …nd that a marginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to raise economic growth.
This study relates to the microeconomic literature on optimal patent design. In this literature, the seminal study is Nordhaus (1969) , who shows that the optimal patent length should balance between the social bene…t of innovation and the social cost of monopolistic distortion. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review on the subsequent developments in this patent-design literature. In this literature, an interesting and important policy lever is forward patent protection that gives rise to the division of pro…t between sequential innovators; see Green and Scotchmer (1995) for an early study. Our study di¤ers from studies in this literature by analyzing the e¤ects of patent instruments on innovation and economic growth in a quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) framework.
As for the macroeconomic literature on patent policy, Judd (1985) provides the seminal DGE analysis on patent length, and he …nds that an in…nite patent length maximizes innovation. Subsequent studies …nd that strengthening patent rights via di¤erent patent instruments does not necessarily increase innovation and may even sti ‡e it. Examples of these studies include Horowitz and Lai (1996) Furukawa (2007 Furukawa ( , 2010 and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against imitation, and Chu (2009) on blocking patents. Our study complements these growth-theoretic studies by analyzing a novel channel through the escapeinfringement e¤ect that gives rise to a non-monotonic e¤ect of patent rights on innovation and economic growth. Furthermore, we contrast the e¤ects of blocking patents under an exogenous step size versus an endogenous step size of innovation and show that the same patent instrument can have drastically di¤erent e¤ects on innovation in di¤erent environments.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 de…nes the equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium allocation. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of patent instruments on innovation and economic growth. The …nal section concludes.
The model
In this section, we consider a quality-ladder growth model as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) . 2 To consider the division of pro…t between sequential innovators along the quality ladder, we assume that each entrant (i.e., the most recent innovator) infringes the patent of the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator). As a result of this patent infringement, the entrant has to transfer a share s 2 To make the quality-ladder model more suitable for calibration, we introduce capital accumulation into the model. Given that the GrossmanHelpman model has been well-studied, we will describe the familiar features brie ‡y to conserve space and discuss the new features in details.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Their lifetime utility is
where > 0 is the discount rate, and C t is the consumption of …nal goods at time t. Households maximize (1) subject to
A t is the value of assets (including capital and patents) owned by households, and r t is the real rate of return on assets. Households inelastically supply one unit of labor to earn the wage rate W t . The price of …nal goods is normalized to unity. From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive. Final goods Y t are produced via a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
where
Competitive …rms producing …nal goods take as given the output price and input prices P t (i) for i 2 [0; 1]. From pro…t maximization, the conditional demand function for X t (i) is
Intermediate goods
In this sector, there is a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. Given the technology of the most recent innovator, the production function of intermediate goods i is
Q t (i) is the highest level of technology in industry i at time t, and it is given by Q t (i) = Q nt(i) j=1 z j (i). The integer n t (i) is the number of innovations that have occurred in industry i as of time t, and z j (i) > 1 is the step size of the j-th innovation in industry i. If z j (i) = z for all j 2 f1; :::; n t (i)g and for all i 2 [0; 1], then Q t (i) simpli…es to z nt(i) as in the canonical quality-ladder model. Given that the equilibrium features a symmetric step size z for all j 2 f1; :::; n t (i)g and for all i 2 [0; 1], we use z to denote z j (i) for notational simplicity. L x;t (i) and K t (i) are respectively the number of production workers and the amount of capital employed in industry i at time t. From cost minimization, the marginal cost of production for the industry leader (i.e., the most recent innovator) in industry i is
where R t is the rental price of capital. The standard no-arbitrage condition is R t = r t + , where is the depreciation rate of capital. Given M C t (i), the industry leader charges a markup over the marginal cost to maximize pro…t. In the canonical quality-ladder model, this markup is given by the step size z due to Bertrand competition. Here we consider patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Goh and Olivier (2002) by assuming that the markup > 1 is a policy instrument chosen by the patent authority. Therefore, the monopolistic price is given by
As a result, the amount of pro…t generated in industry i is
where the second equality of (9) follows from (5). Furthermore, labor income in industry i is
In each industry i, the most recent innovator (i.e., the entrant) infringes the patent of the previous innovator (i.e., the incumbent). As a result of this patent infringement, the most recent innovator pays a licensing fee by transferring a share s 2 [0; 1] of her pro…t to the previous innovator. Here we di¤er from O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) by considering an endogenous pro…t-division rule given by s = =z, where the patent instrument 2 [0; z] captures the negative e¤ect of blocking patents. For a given z, a larger forces the entrant to pay a higher licensing fee to the incumbent and hence reduces the entrant's incentives for innovation. However, the entrant can reduce the amount of this licensing fee by developing a more substantial innovation through a larger step size z. This setup is reasonable because in reality, the more di¤erent an innovation is from previous innovations, the less likely that it would be considered as an infringement. Given a lower chance of patent infringement, the entrant would have more power to bargain for a lower licensing fee. Due to pro…t division, the entrant obtains (1 s) t while the incumbent obtains s t . The most recent innovation and the second-most recent innovation are owned by di¤erent …rms due to the well-known Arrow replacement e¤ect. 
R&D and innovation
Denote V 2;t (i) as the value of the patent on the second-most recent innovation in industry i. Because t (i) = t for i 2 [0; 1] from (9), V 2;t (i) = V 2;t in a symmetric equilibrium that features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries. 4 The familiar no-arbitrage condition for V 2;t is
Equation (11) equates the interest rate r t to the asset return per unit of asset. The asset return is given by the sum of (a) the pro…t s t received by the patent holder, (b) the capital gain : V 2;t , and (c) the expected capital loss t V 2;t due to creative destruction for which t is the Poisson arrival rate of innovation. As for the value of the patent on the most recent innovation, the no-arbitrage condition for V 1;t is
The intuition behind (12) is the same as (11) except for the last term. When the next innovation occurs, the current industry leader becomes the secondmost recent innovator and hence her net capital loss is V 1;t V 2;t .
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by k 2 [0; 1], and each entrepreneur hires R&D labor L r;t (k) for innovation. The expected return from R&D is
The arrival rate of innovation for entrepreneur k is
where ' > 0 is a productivity parameter for R&D, and '=z captures the e¤ect that a larger step size of innovation has a lower chance of success. The zero-expected-pro…t condition for R&D is
For the rest of this study, we focus on the balanced growth path. In this case, (11) becomes
where g is the steady-state growth rate of pro…t, and the second equality of (16) follows from (3). 5 Similarly, (12) becomes
An entrepreneur takes and V 2 as given. Given that the step size z is endogenous, she chooses z to maximize
where s = =z. 6 This optimization yields the equilibrium step size given by
It is useful to note that the equilibrium arrival rate is also a function of . To ensure that z > 1 in equilibrium, we impose the following condition.
Condition B (blocking patents):
2 + ( ) + ( ) > 1.
In Section 4, we will show that z is strictly increasing in even after taking into account the general-equilibrium e¤ect on , so that there exists a lowerbound value of above which Condition B holds. Equation (19) yields an important insight that increasing the blocking e¤ect of patent protection causes the innovators to develop more substantial innovations in order to escape patent infringement. In equilibrium, the pro…t-division rule under an endogenous step size of innovation becomes
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fC t ; Y t ; X t (i); K t ; L x;t ; L r;t g 1 t=0
and a time path of prices fP t (i); W t ; R t ; r t ; V 1;t ; V 2;t g 1 t=0 . Also, at each instant of time, households maximize utility taking fW t ; r t g as given;
competitive …nal-goods …rms produce Y t and maximize pro…t taking P t (i) as given; monopolistic intermediate-goods …rms employ fL x;t ; K t g to produce X t (i) and choose P t (i) to maximize pro…t taking fW t ; R t g as given;
R&D entrepreneurs employ L r;t to maximize expected pro…t taking fW t ; V 1;t g as given;
the labor market clears such that L x;t + L r;t = 1; the …nal-goods market clears such that Y t = C t + I t , where I t is capital investment; the capital stock accumulates according to
Equilibrium allocation
To derive the equilibrium allocation, we combine (10) and (15) to obtain
Then, we substitute (9), (16) and (17) into (21) and rearrange terms to obtain
where z and s are given by (19) and (20) . Using L x = 1 L r and = 'L r =z from (14), we can re-express (22) as
Equation (23) determines the steady-state equilibrium arrival rate of innovation. Both the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side (RHS) of (23) are increasing in . To ensure that the equilibrium is strictly positive, we impose a lower bound on the R&D-productivity parameter ' given by Condition R (R&D productivity): ' > 4 (1 ) =( 1).
Given Condition R, LHSj =0 = ' > 4 (1 ) 2 =( 1) = RHSj =0 . Furthermore, LHS is a linear and increasing function in while RHS is a convex and increasing function in . Therefore, RHS crosses LHS exactly once from below giving rise to a unique equilibrium ; see Figure 1 for an illustration. Solving the quadratic equation in (23) yields a closed-form solution for
given by
) is a composite parameter.
E¤ects of patents on innovation and growth
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of the two patent instruments f ; g on innovation and economic growth. We begin by deriving the steady-state equilibrium growth rates of output and technology. Substituting (6) into (4) yields
where the aggregate level of technology is de…ned as
The second equality of (26) applies z j (i) = z so that Q t (i) = (z ) nt(i) . Applying the law of large numbers, the log of Z t becomes
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is
On the balanced growth path, Y t and K t grow at g =(1 ). The …rst patent instrument that we analyze is patent breadth . An increase in shifts down RHS of (23) causing to increase. Intuitively, a larger patent breadth enables the industry leader to charge a higher markup, and this larger monopolistic power increases the amount of pro…ts as well as providing more incentives for R&D and innovation. This is the traditional positive e¤ect of patent protection emphasized by proponents of intellectual property rights. The higher arrival rate of innovation also increases the equilibrium growth rate g if is su¢ ciently large. To see this result,
Then, using log approximation ln(1 + x) x, we can show that
Therefore, if > 1 (i.e., ln > 0), then @g =@ > 0.
Proposition 1
The arrival rate of innovation is increasing in patent breadth . If > 1, then economic growth is also increasing in patent breadth .
The second patent instrument that we analyze is the e¤ect of blocking patents captured by . However, we …rst analyze its e¤ect under an exogenous step size of innovation. In this case, z = z > 1 and s = =z, where z is a constant. Furthermore, (22) can be re-expressed as
It can be shown that Figure 1 also applies to (31). A larger shifts down LHS of (31). As a result, decreases, and this lower arrival arrival rate of innovation also decreases the equilibrium growth rate g because z is assumed to be exogenous in this case. Intuitively, a larger e¤ect of blocking patents forces entrants to transfer a larger share of pro…t to incumbents reducing the entrants'incentives for R&D and innovation. This is the recently emphasized negative e¤ect of patent protection emphasized by opponents of intellectual property rights.
Proposition 2 Under an exogenous step size z, the arrival rate of innovation and economic growth are decreasing in the blocking e¤ect of patents.
Finally, we analyze blocking patents under an endogenous step size of innovation. In this case, z and s are given by (19) and (20) . A larger induces innovators to choose a larger step size z for a given , but this larger step size also reduces the equilibrium arrival rate of innovation due to lower R&D productivity '=z . In (23) , an increase in shifts up RHS, so that has a negative e¤ect on as in the case of exogenous step size. However, with endogenous step size, the larger z chosen by innovators also contributes to economic growth. In other words, an increase in has a negative e¤ect on g through (i.e., the frequency of innovation) as well as a positive e¤ect through z (i.e., the size of innovation). To our knowledge, this additional escape-infringement e¤ect of blocking patents has never been analyzed in the patent literature. It is this novel mechanism that gives rise to a non-monotonic e¤ect of blocking patents on innovation.
Di¤erentiating g = ln z with respect to yields
Therefore, the equilibrium step size z is strictly increasing in even after taking into account the general-equilibrium e¤ect on . Equations (32) and (33) show that there are both positive and negative e¤ects of blocking patents on economic growth. On the one hand, if is su¢ ciently large, the negative e¤ect dominates the positive e¤ect such that @g =@ < 0. As approaches its upper bound '( 1)=[4(1 ) ], Condition R becomes an equality, and hence, approaches zero; in this case, the negative e¤ect dominates the positive e¤ect. On the other hand, if is su¢ ciently small, the positive e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect such that @g =@ > 0. As approaches its lower bound given by Condition B, z approaches one, and hence, the positive e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect in this case. The opposite signs of @g =@ at the upper and lower bounds of imply that g must be a non-monotonic function in . For the special case of ! 0, (23) yields
Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate becomes
In this case, g is explicitly an inverted-U function in and reaches a maximum at = exp(1). Finally, we have conducted a large number of numerical simulations for the general case of > 0 and found that g is always an inverted-U function in .
Proposition 3 Under the endogenous step size z , the arrival rate of innovation is decreasing in , but the step size of innovation is increasing in . Therefore, blocking patents generate a non-monotonic e¤ect on economic growth.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to quantify the blocking e¤ect of patent protection on innovation and economic growth. There are …ve structural parameters f ; ; ; '; g that are relevant for this numerical exercise. First, we set the discount rate and the capital-share parameter to their standard values of 0:04 and 0:3 respectively. Then, we use three empirical moments to calibrate the remaining three parameters. Using (10) and (22), we can express R&D expenditure as a share of GDP as
where s is given by (20) . In the US, S r is about 0.025. Then, we use (24) to set the arrival rate of innovation to 0:33 so that the expected duration between arrivals of innovation is 3 years as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009) . Finally, we use (28) to set the growth rate g of total factor productivity (TFP) to a standard value of 0:015 for the US economy. These three empirical moments pin down the values of f ; '; g = f1:03; 9:71; 0:94g.
Given these calibrated parameter values, we perform a counterfactual exercise by increasing to examine whether strengthening the blocking e¤ect of patent protection would increase or decrease economic growth. The result is reported in Figure 2 . In Figure 2 , we see that = 0:94 is on the upwardsloping side of the curve, and this …nding is robust to varying the parameter values within a reasonable range. In our sensitivity analysis, we …nd that is on the downward-sloping side of the curve only when we consider an extremely low arrival rate of less than 0.05, which implies an expected duration between innovation arrivals of more than 20 years. The intuition is as follows. From (28), = g = ln z ; therefore, for a given TFP growth rate g , a lower arrival rate of innovation must be accompanied by a larger step size z , which in turn implies a larger . Although the literature does not provide a precise estimate for , the expected duration between innovation arrivals should be less than 20 years. Therefore, we conclude that a marginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to raise economic growth when we account for the escape-infringement e¤ect.
Conclusion
In this note, we have analyzed the e¤ects of di¤erent patent instruments on innovation and economic growth. We …nd that whether stronger patent rights stimulate or sti ‡e innovation depends on the underlying patent instrument. While patent breadth has a positive e¤ect on innovation, blocking patents generate a negative e¤ect on innovation under an exogenous step size of innovation. However, the e¤ect of blocking patents on innovation and economic growth becomes non-monotonic once we allow for an endogenous step size of innovation, and this non-monotonic e¤ect of patent rights on innovation is consistent with the …nding of recent empirical studies. Finally, calibrating the model to aggregate data, we …nd that a marginal increase in the blocking e¤ect of patent protection is likely to stimulate economic growth. 
